There’s no doubt in most minds that the recruiting undertaken so far by Perth Glory this off-season is for the most part quite impressive. In Danny Vukovic they have captured a quality keeper who significantly improves the Glory defence; the still-unconfirmed signing of Shane Smeltz adds some much-needed lethal finishing to the forward line, and the additions of proven A-League performers like Travis Dodd can only strengthen the resolve of a Perth team with a lot to prove in 2011/2012.

 

For many though, a glaring weakness remains at the West Australian club; and it has nothing to do with the squad. Now without a Director of Football, Glory manager Ian Ferguson has to face the new season alone with the axe firmly poised above his head – no matter how much the club says it supports him, you have to believe that if Perth underperform at the beginning of the season, he will be shown the door sooner rather than later. That’s if he even makes it that far, what with all the rumours circulating about a new coach. It isn’t Ferguson the man that worries fans though – but rather the tactical legacy that he is inheriting, along with the skills he displayed last season.

 

 

Four-Four-Fecking-Two

If you think of the impact the English have had on the history of world football, you’d have to think the combination of four defenders, four midfielders, and two strikers would be – better or worse – near the top of that list. Much used and much derided at the same time, it’s long been a staple of their home divisions and the national team itself. The formation is of course neither good nor bad – it is a framework, something abstract with no ability to make an impact on the world. It’s concrete implementations however can be the stuff of either dreams or nightmares; capable of winning world cups on one hand, or capable of putting audiences to sleep on the other.

 

When David Mitchell began at Perth Glory, he cobbled together a 4-4-2 that initially had the ability to excite thanks to an iconic, if not eclectic, strike partnership of French Ivorian Eugene Dadi and future Socceroo Nikita Rukavytsya. Each slammed in ten goals in a season of entertaining, if not always effective, goal-scoring football. But the mental fragility and defensive inadequacies of the team were shown up, and Glory were soon consigned to second last place with a series of woeful away games and some absolute floggings at the hands of teams who had worked out a way to mark Dadi out of the game and reduce, if not always nullify, the threat of a raw Rukavytsya.

 

Work then began on tweaking the formation – or rather the personnel who staffed it – in the next season. Midfield steel was added in the form of Jacob Burns and Steven McGarry, defensive stability arrived in the form of Andy Todd and Chris Coyne, and a touch of class was added thanks to the return of Socceroo attacker Mile Sterjovski. It was possibly the best setup Glory have cobbled together in the A-League, and it resulted in a fifth-placed finish and finals football. But the cracks were still there – the formation was very rigid, unable to change with the pace and developments of the game itself, and the defensive line and midfield were too slow, leaving gaps large enough for any playmaker or quick attacker to exploit with glee.

 

 

A Legacy of Confusion

Mitchell would occasionally break away from the norm and try another strategy; a 4-5-1 was used to some success, but mostly failed as the team lacked the pace to connect the very isolated striker with a supporting cast of midfielders. A lack of an out-and-out target man also ensured the amusing sight of defenders hoofing the ball up field to a triple-teamed Robbie Fowler...the man might be called God, but he’s not going to work miracles – growing another three feet taller included.

 

Such stratagems of genius persisted under Mitchell’s successor Ian Ferguson. When packing the midfield didn’t work, he reverted to the tried-and-true 4-4-2. When about ten or so defeats later this obviously wasn’t working, he switched into a diamond midfield to limited success. By the end of the season, it was a struggle to work out exactly what was going on, such was the extent of the chopping and changing. Throughout it all, the same Mitchell-era problems were there for all to see;

  • We waited too long to make substitutions.
  • We then made the wrong substitutions.
  • We failed to make fluid changes in formation and strategy during the course of a game.
  • We had a mental fragility that would reduce past players to tears if they happened to be watching.
  • Our set pieces were absolutely woeful.

 

But to top it all off, the major problem was this – we simply didn’t play to our strengths. Mostly because the coaching staff didn’t really know what our strengths were, I would think. At no point have Glory had a set tactic in mind and then recruited the players to play it, and equally at no point have they been able to come up with a strategy to suit the players that they did have.

 

 

A Fresh Approach?

David Mitchell’s approach to recruitment and strategy, when you look back on it, can best be described as “look for some big names, put them on the pitch, and hope they make it up as they go along, maybe even win!”. To be fair to Ferguson, he didn’t really have much choice but to continue this approach with the squad he inherited – and when he eventually began to make some of his own changes, the train was already off the rails. The Glory squad as a whole was so unbalanced in hindsight that it isn’t even funny – it was incredibly slow (Coyne, Todd, Burns, McGarry, Fowler, Jelic made for the spine of a three-toed sloth), had no left backs, and lacked any midfield creativity (Adriano Pellegrino does not count as a creative midfielder) and had an average age of a Galapagos Tortoise.

 

These are all mistakes that Ian Ferguson now has another chance to correct. He can have a proper tactical philosophy set out in his mind, much like Ange Postecoglou did at Brisbane Roar, and then choose players to suit. The vast gaps of creativity can be filled, the sick beds cleared, and the average age brought down a generation or two. At least, that’s what we hope.

 

The recruits brought in so far appear to be neither here nor there; Vukovic and Berger are still youngsters, but Heffernan, Dodd, and Young – whilst experienced A-League campaigners – are hardly spring chickens. You also get the feeling that we’re not exactly building up a Barcelona style of play here, either. The full backs can bomb forward, but that’s hardly any different to what Naum and Neville/Jamie Coyne did last year. Whilst we know Dodd can unlock A-League defences – he has certainly done it to ours often enough – it is generally through good positioning and an attacking run at the opposition rather than any sublime skill or creative passing. Even Shane Smeltz, who can be relied upon to score goals himself regardless of his own teammates, is more a focal point for attack rather than a creator.

 

 

Workers of the World, Play Football!

The thing is, from what we’ve seen of Ferguson’s coaching last season, and his recruiting so far, it seems unlikely that he’s going to come up with a novel strategy full of skill and tactical flair. Rather, his players are going to be expected to work hard, toil, and use their physical prowess. Run fast. Keep fit. Use your strength. All items you’d expect to see on the Ian Ferguson list of tactical adjustments. He might very well point to the Brisbane Roar double-winning team as an example of where quick movement of the ball will get you. But if he does, I’m horrifically scared that he’ll have missed the point.

 

Brisbane didn’t just win the league on their physical attributes alone. Yes, they were fit. Yes, they moved the ball constantly. Yes, they had players that could go on fast breaks. But core to it all they had players of skill, creativity, and excellent technical ability. Broich, Solorzano, Henrique, Barbarouses, Paartalu – all ticking one or more of these categories whilst being physically able. Perth Glory doesn’t have anyone like this – Mile Sterjovski perhaps coming the closest, but Mile’s head has been screwed on the wrong way for about 18 months now. Travis Dodd might have some of these attributes, but he’s older than every single one of the aforementioned five players. Just recently 25 year old Marcos Flores won the Johnny Warren medal for the A-League’s best player – where’s our fountain of youthful midfield creativity? And if you dare say it’s Adriano Pellegrino…

 

To borrow an example from the world of motorsport, it doesn’t matter how big your engine is – if you lack the skill, vision, tactical knowledge, and technique needed to pilot the car to its very limit, you won’t win races. This is why when I once did a series of hot laps in a V8 supercar, my times were a mile slower than the warm up laps performed by my rally driving tutor! It’s the same with football – you can be the world’s greatest athlete, but if you’ve got the first touch of George Michael it’s hardly going to get you anywhere, is it? Someone who doesn’t hold the AIS beep test record but can actually cross a ball is far more valuable than a guy who can just run a bit faster than everyone else.

 

You’d hope then, that Ian Ferguson and Perth Glory have realised this. But we really won’t be able to tell until we see what the rest of the recruitment is like – and then of course how the team lines up on the field. Because if the last few years have taught Perth Glory fans anything at all, it’s that good-looking names on paper doesn’t mean jack when it comes to actually kicking a ball.